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Abstract— Current computing trends such as cloud computing, 
file sharing and social networking promote collaboration and allow 
greater mobility for users.  Nevertheless, these computing trends 
increase the vulnerability of networks to security threats and 
challenge network resources.  An ingenious technique employed by 
attackers for retaining anonymity is by exploiting intermediary host 
computers or stepping stones to instigate attacks on other computers.  
This paper explores novel application of the stepping stone detection 
concept in addressing network threats such as spams, backdoors, 
proxy server intrusions and denial of service attacks.   Preliminary 
stepping stone detection models for each security threat will be 
constructed and the potential detection process is delineated.  These 
preliminary concepts and models may prove useful for further 
optimization of network security in conjunction with other 
conventional detection techniques. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
urrent computing trends such as file sharing, video 
streaming, cloud computing, interactive games and social 
networking promotes collaboration and allow greater mobility 
for users.  Computers share their resources as a means to 
inexpensively handle data and perform tasks.   In these 
network architectures, accurate, rapid and reliable access to 
shared data is essential. Nevertheless, the shared 
computational resources and operations increase the 
vulnerability of these networks to intrusions and security 
threats such as spams, backdoors, proxy server intrusions and 
denial of service (DoS) attacks, which may jeopardize the 
confidentiality, accuracy and accessibility of shared data.   
For retaining anonymity, an ingenious intrusion technique 
employed by attackers is by exploiting intermediary host 
computers or stepping stones to instigate attacks on other 
computers within the network.     
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The discovery of the stepping stone is important for 
revealing the identity of the fraudster and for preventing 
further escalation of dubious activity.  
 
 
Figure 1: Stepping stone. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the traversal of the stepping stone from 
one host to next through the Internet before the real the victim 
is attacked. From the victim’s perspective, the attacker 
originates from the last stepping stone host  connected to the 
victim. For this reason,  the last host (innocent host) will be 
identified as the attacker. With multifarious inter-connections 
on the Internet, the trace-back to the origin host (the real 
attacker) will be almost impossible. Therefore, research on 
stepping stone detection (SSD) is   imperative. 
  Various algorithms for stepping stone detection have been 
developed based on traffic flow and characteristics [1-15].  
The success SSD in detecting the true attacker brings to light 
its novel application in the detection of other network threats 
such as spams, backdoors, proxy server intrusions and denial 
of service (DoS) attacks. Existing methods for analyzing and 
detecting spams, backdoors, proxy server intrusions and DoS 
attacks are based on statistical methods, decision analysis, 
expert systems, neural networks, and fuzzy logic[1-26].   
To our knowledge, the SSD concept has not, to date, been 
extended to the detection of backdoors, proxy server intrusions 
and denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
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This paper explores the novel application of stepping stone 
detection in addressing a diverse range of network threats such 
as spams, backdoors, proxy server intrusions and denial of 
service (DoS) attacks.  Preliminary stepping stone detection 
models for each security threat will be constructed 
mathematically and the potential detection process for each is 
delineated. These preliminary concepts and models may prove 
useful for further optimization of network security in 
conjunction with other conventional detection techniques.   
The paper proceeds as follows. To understand the SSD 
models presented later, important terminologies for SSD are 
first defined in Section II.  In Section III, as a basis for the 
modeling, the general concept of SSD and the current, 
previous and future landscape for SSD are illustrated.  Section 
IV then presents our four novel preliminary SSD models for 
SPAM, backdoor, proxy and DoS attack detection.  
 
II. TERMINOLOGY 
Some important terminologies are presented here as to 
facilitate the understanding of the models presented in next 
sections.  First, a host is any computer that connected to a 
computer network.   





























Figure 2: General Stepping Stone 
 
 In Figure 2, assume Host A is a victim, Host B is the source 
and Host C is the destination. Since Host B is the source, the 
data flow from Host B to Host A is identified as an incoming 
flow for Host A. However, the data flow between Host A and 
Host C is considered an outgoing flow from Host A to Host C. 
In stepping stone detection-based research, the source refers 
to the origin host and the destination refers to the destination 
of the source. A target or victim is usually defined as the last 
destination of the stepping stone. Then, another term that 
needs to be considered is the incoming and outgoing flow. 
Incoming flow on the other hand refers to the data that enters a 
host and outgoing flow indicates the data leave a host. 
Stepping stone occurs when the host is used for forwarding the 
data, i.e.by entering and then exiting the host. 
Stepping stone detection can be defined as the processes of 
detecting the stepping stoned host. When one host forwards 
data to another host, this is known as the connection chain. 
The main goal of stepping stone detection research is to 
collects the list of hosts. Host-based SSD (HSSD) is SSD 
focused on solving the stepping stone problem in a host as 
compared to Network-based SSD (NSSD) which targets SSD 
problems in a network environment. Figure 3 shows the HSSD 



















Figure 3: HSSD 
 
From Figure 3, it is clear that HSSD employs a host to 
detect the stepping stone. It is done by compare incoming and 
outgoing data traffic. In this case Host B receive incoming data 
traffic from Host A and the data traffic data flows out as 
outgoing data to Host C. For HSSD, the comparison occurs 
between incoming and outgoing of the data traffic on the same 
host. On the other words, HSSD only involves a host as to 
detect the stepping stone. 
From Figure 4, NSSD involves the detection of stepping 
stone from one or more hosts. The detection also involves the 
incoming and outgoing data for each host. In this case, each 
connection between the host need to be identified either it is 
stepping stoned or not stepping stoned. The list of these list 
create the NSSD. From the explanation, it is clear that NSSD 
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Figure 4: NSSD 
 
III. SSD IN GENERAL 





Figure 5: Basic of Stepping Stone Detection 
  
From Fig. 5, there are three hosts labeled as A, B and C. 
Host B (Host i) exists before Host A (Host i - 1) and Host C 
(Host i + 1) exists after Host B. i represents the current 
stepping stoned host, i - 1 represents the host before the i host 
and i + 1 represents the host after the i-th host. Each host has 
its own incoming and outgoing flow. Host A has one incoming 
(Ain) and one outcoming flow (Aout). Host B and C also have 
their corresponding incoming and outgoing flow, denoted Bin, 
Cin and Bout, Cout respectively.  
 Any host may be defined as a stepping stone host when the 
incoming flow is similar to outgoing flow. If nin and nout 




From (1), if the incoming and outgoing flow is equal, n_in= 
n(out )  this means the host is a stepping stoned host or nss. 
Otherwise, the host is not a stepping stone. 
 The connection chain from Host A to Host B, denoted by 
CCAB (may also can be denoted as CCBA because CCAB = 
CCBA) occurs when Host A and B are nss. A or B represents the 
source or destination of the stepping stone. In Fig. 1, there are 
two connection chains, CCAB and CCBC. 
 In SSD, the series of connection chain that exists along the 





wheres is the source, d is the destination. From (2), it is 
clear that SSD has a collection of CC from to  
. However, it is only to be true when the number 
of CC is more than one, |SSD|> 1. 
 
IV. HISTORY OF SSD 
As an overview to SSD and to place our novel SSD models 
for emerging fields in context, the general concept of SSD and 
the research landscape of SSD are presented here.  
Generally, we can divide the overall history of SSD into 
three different parts; past SSD, current SSD and future SSD. 
Past SSD refers to SSD approaches used before what we have 
currently. Current SSD on the other hand includes SSD 
approaches that are used presently while future SSD brings 
novel ideas related to the applications of SSD in the future. 











Figure 6: Past, Current and Future SSD 
 
From Figure 6, it is shown that SSD-based research started 
from 1995 and has evolved to what we have today in 2013. 
Current SSD-based research can be considered SSD 
approaches in between 2011 and 2013.  Details about each 
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A. Past SSD 
As the pioneer in SSD research, [1] proposed the concept of 
‘thumbprint’ that summarized a packet’s content by providing 
it with a unique identity which differentiated it from other 
packets. However, the thumbprint solution was not suitable for 
encrypted connections. Consequently, [6] and [3] proposed 
on/off and deviation methods respectively. Unfortunately, 
these two methods were prone to high false positive and active 
perturbation problems. [7] proposed the “reply-echo” method 
to reduce the false positive problem and [8] proposed 
overcoming the perturbation problem using Active Penetration 
Attack (APA).  
APA is a technique created by the intruder to influence the 
SSD process. At the same time, [9] applied the Inter-packet 
delay (IPD) method to solve the stepping stone problem by 
proposing a new use of data that is more effective in detecting 
stepping stones.  
 After [7] first introduced a new technique, Round Trip Time 
(RTT), which is for reducing the false positive rate, past SSD 
researches began conducting experiments related to [7]’s 
research. Research by [10] introduced the “Step-Function” and 
“Conservative & Heuristic” [11] which were methods 
enhanced from [7] methods. The “Step-Function” method 
decreases the false positive and false negative errors and 
successfully worked in the Local Area Network (LAN) 
environment. The “Conservative & Heuristic” method, on the 
other hand, was enhanced to be used in the Internet 
environment. 
 Meanwhile, research by [12] was the only research that 
focused on the wireless environment in detecting stepping 
stones. In their research, state-space algorithm was proposed. 
However, after that, there has been no such research on SSD 
conducted in the wireless environment.  
 In conclusion, it seems that past SSD research focused on 
the right data type to be used in the SSD approach. The 
differences lie only in different types of data (e.g. data, time, 
inter-packet delay) and their concentration on RTT at the end 
of the past SSD period. 
 
B. Current SSD 
Present SSD research begins with [13], which concentrates on 
the confidence bound problem, false positive rate with and 
without chaff perturbation based on computational and random 
walks theories. [14] later divided SSD methods into three 
categories: host, network and system.  
However, in this research study, SSD methods are divided 
into only two categories; host and network SSDs. This is 
supported by [9] who also divided SSD methods into two 
categories. For this research, a system (from [14] can be either 
host or network-based SSD) and should not become a separate 
category of the SSD methods. Studied in  [15] has proposed a 
special testbed for SSD attack testing.  
According to their research, the testbed can be used 
dynamically on different types of SSD approaches by using 
different types of attack. After that, research on SSD continued 
with the introduction of the buffering method used to perturb 
the SSD approach. This research was conducted by [16]. 
Through a simulation of the watermark-based SSD, it was 
shown that by only buffering the packet and arranging it 
according to user-defined patterns, the watermark-based SSDs 
can be perturbed easily.  
Several studied in [13], [17], [15], [16] and [18] have shown 
that SSD researchers have changed their focus from enhancing 
the SSD approach to something that can make SSD more 
robust against perturbation. This can be seen in research by 
[13] that re-directed SSD research towards achieving less false 
positives and false negative rates. One of studied by [19] was 
created a method to influence SSD and studied in [15] also 
was provided a testbed through which the SSD approach can 
be examined. [14], on the other hand, provided Stepping Stone 
Detection taxonomy to expose those outside the field to SSD.  
Research on the present SSD have become more widespread 
with the introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques. 
Research which applies AI techniques are referred to as RTT-
based research [20], [18], [21], [22]. This effort was started by 
[21] who proposed the data mining technique to mine for 
TCP/IP packets in the effort of finding RTT. The application 
of AI was continued by [18] who introduced the Neural 
Network technique that focuses on finding RTT. [18] once 
more continued their research on Neural Network was used in 
SSD but this time it focused on improving the performance of 
Neural Network techniques used in their previous research.  
[19] [20], on the other hand, proposed a clustering-partitioning 
algorithm to find TCP packet’s RTT. 
 In [18] was also involved in a research that focused on SSD 
perturbation. In their work, they proposed the packet 
fluctuation approach by generating two algorithms and test 
them when chaff perturbation exists and studied in [23] was 
proposed the association rules technique to solve SSD in a 
host-based environment. In their research, they used 
association rules for detecting connection chains in a host-
based environment. Clearly, from the discussion on AI 
techniques that have been used, it seems that their technique 
had the potential of solving SSD problems. 
 The present SSD research not only focuses on issues beyond 
those of the past SSD research, but also introduces new 
discoveries to the SSD research world. The introduction of 
different AI techniques used to detect RTT and later to detect 
stepping stones, shows that the present SSD is evolving. The 
present SSD also shows that the extensive buffering method 
used as perturb to the present SSD approach exists [19]. There 
are also studies which focus on confidence bound [13], false 
positive and false negative rates [18]. Attached testbed which 
is much needed in SSD research has also been proposed by 
[15]. 
 
C. Future SSD 
SSD research that would become the focus of researchers in 
the future is inferred from the literature of the past and present 
SSD researches. With regards to the type of data that would be 
used in future SSD research, it is predicted that timing-based 
data (and RTT) would still be chosen. This fact actually comes 
from the past and present SSD which used timing-based data 
as the data needed to be captured in detecting stepping stones. 
Research by [1] changed to timing-based data after researchers 
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realized that the type of data using payload could not be used 
in encrypted connections [3] and [6]. Research using RTT as 
the type of applied data were [7], [24], [25], who could also be 
categorized as researchers using timing-based data type 
because RTT actually uses time as its main data type.  
The difference is that the RTT-based research relies on the 
echoes of the packets. In conclusion, timing-based data would 
become a data type to be used in future SSD research. 
Secondly, research on SSD would focus on the applications of 
AI techniques. Whether the AI technique is used to obtain 
RTT or more will be discussed later.  
 Recently, [23] proposed the associative rules technique to 
solve the problems of SSD by taking arrival time as the data 
input. In their research, connection chains were traced by just 
using the packet’s arrival and departure times. 
Future SSD would also focus on the development of SSD 
testbeds. The standard testbed is necessary to the SSD-based 
research to execute the standard experiment or testing. In the 
testbed, the requirements, the tools and the topology that will 
be used are well defined. So far, SSD research has only 
depended on the testbed developed by [15]. Unfortunately, this 
testbed has still to be made known to the public. Moreover, 
from the readings it was found that a standard SSD testbed 
does not exist to date and most researchers use their own 
testbeds. Because of the use of AI techniques in the SSD 
environment, future SSD should focus on the development of 
testbeds that support AI SSD. 
 Another possibility that could become the research focus for 
future SSD is the concept of hybrid SSD. More often than not, 
the past and present SSD research has only depended on 
network-based SSD (NSSD) [2], [1], [6]. Although these 
studies did not explicitly define their SSD approach as NSSD, 
the use of network packets as the main source of stepping 
stone detection process shows that it is NSSD. Studies by [14] 
and [26] have divided the SSD approach into network-based 
and host-based SSD (HSSD).  
 From the discussion on past, current and future SSD, it is 
concluded that all of the researcher focus to the main usage of 
SSD; to detect stepping stone either in host or network-based 
environment. No such a research that realized the other usage 
of the SSD in other fields of research. This is what we will 
provide in this paper, to provide a new direction of the 
stepping stone detection based research. 
V. THE NEW APPLICATION OF SSD   
As discussed in previous sections, stepping stone detection-
based research was mostly limited to the detection of stepping 
stones without looking to the full capabilities of stepping stone 
detection in other fields of research.  Suggestions for potential 
applications of SSD in other fields are listed here. These 
consist of spam detection, proxy server detection, backdoor 
detection and Dos attack detection. Figure 7 shows the 
classification of new applications based on SSD. Each new 
application that inspired by the SSD will be discussed later on 

























Figure 7: New Application for SSD 
 
 
A. Spam Detection 
Spam is the abuse of electronic messaging systems by 
indiscriminate sending of unsolicited messages in bulk [27]. 
Although several types of media such as instant messaging, 
USENET newsgroup and web search engine fall prey to spam 
[28], the potential use for SSD may find its way in e-mail-
based spam.  
A variety of spam detection techniques have been 
investigated for e-mail-based spam such as [29], [30] and [31].  
In the case of [29], the detection is carried out manually by 
deleting the spammed e-mail directly from user e-mail’s 
mailbox as we.  In [30] on the other hand, filtering is proposed 
for spam detection.  However, both techniques classify a 
message by simply identifying keyword, phrase and sending 
address.  This results in a high percentage of false positive 
signals. To overcome the problem [31] recommended suggests 
the Artificial Intelligent (AI) techniques.  However, frequently, 
the application of AI in spam detection, such as data mining, 
tends to be time consuming. 
Figure 8 shows a snapshot of a typical spam received in a 
mail box. The spam e-mail appears as an advertisement to the 
user. Other purposes for spamming include phishing and fraud. 
From the SSD perspective, a spam can be detected from the 
incoming and outgoing e-mail port from a host. Instead of 
detection on many choices of port that need to be monitored, 
detection of the spam can be made from the incoming port and 
the outgoing port of the e-mail. This allows the SSD approach 
to be more focused on the detection of a specific port, rather 
than all ports used by other applications. For instance, port 
number 25, 143 and 110 are used for Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP), Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) 







































Issue 3, Volume 7, 2013 101
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND INFORMATICS
 
 
e-mail, respectively. These are actually the ports that need to 
be monitored in SSD approach. In fact, the total number of 




Figure 8: Example of Spam 
 
The spam e-mail appears as an advertisement to the user. 
Other purposes for spamming include phishing and fraud. 
From the SSD perspective, a spam can be detected from the 
incoming and outgoing e-mail port from a host. Instead of 
detection on many choices of port that need to be monitored, 
detection of the spam can be made from the incoming port and 
the outgoing port of the e-mail. This allows the SSD approach 
to be more focused on the detection of a specific port, rather 
than all ports used by other applications. For instance, port 
number 25, 143 and 110 are used for Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP), Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) 
and Post Office Protocol Version 3 (POP3) applications of the 
e-mail, respectively. These are actually the ports that need to 
be monitored in SSD approach. In fact, the total number of 
ports used by the application range up to 65535 ports. 
The different point between the usages of SSD concept in 
the spam detection is the number of incoming and outgoing 
traffic definitely not in an equal numbers. In fact, the incoming 
spam usually addressed to one receiver, and then the same e-
mail will be used to be sent to many other receivers. Therefore, 




From (3), it is shows that the incoming e-mail in a host should 
be less than the outgoing of the e-mail. If there are n hosts 




k is the number of host.  
From (4), we can collect all of the host that involved as the 




In (5), the spam SSD actually collects the connection chain 
between one host to another host. If (5) has been applied to 
different mail servers, the origin of the spam may possibly be 
identified easily. In other word, the list of hosts that are 
involved in the spam is actually the connection chain that 
exists between one host to another host. 
 
B. Proxy Server Detection 
A proxy server is a server that sits between a client 
application, such as a web browser and a real server [32].  


































Figure 9: General Setup of Proxy Server. 
 
From Figure 9, it is clear that proxy server will act as an 
intermediary for connection requests from the hosts or clients 
to the web server. Therefore, the proxy server will temporarily 
store any data transmitted between the hosts. Detecting the 
proxy server is important because it will prevent the user from 
remaining anonymous in the network. 
A diverse range of approaches for proxy server detection 
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network administrator to use specialized monitoring software 
such as Wireshark [34] for proxy server detection.  However, 
this approach is not infallible. Another approach is to use 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which is more fail-safe than 
the conventional approach, although it can be time-consuming.  
The use of data mining technique in IDS possibly is the cause 
of this latency [34][35][36]. 
To alleviate latency in proxy server detection, we propose a 
simple SSD-based approach.  A preliminary model of basic 
proxy server communication based on SSD is shown in Fig. 
10. 
 
Figure 10: Proxy Server Communication 
 
 
Form Fig. 10, Host j sends a request to Host l through Host k 
as the proxy server. Therefore, by using the definitions given 
in (1) and (2), CCj,k = CCk,l and CCl,k = CCk,j. For the proxy 
server detection through SSD, each host involved: 
 
 
For network-based proxy server detection or the list of 
connection chains involved in the proxy server, it based on: 
 
where 
k is the last number of host. By assuming  
 
Hosts, d also including Hostd,s for each host, we can write a 
full network-based in the form of 
 
 
From (7), it is clear that to detect the proxy server; we simply 
need to find the incoming and outgoing traffic on the chosen 
host. 
C. Backdoor Detection 
Backdoor can be defined as a hidden approach for bypassing 
normal computer authentication systems [37]. The backdoor 
program can be an installed program or exist from the system 
processes. Backdoor programs are also embedded from 
various worms such as Sobig and Mydoom. 
 In August 2009, Sophos Labs discovered the W32/Induc-A 
virus which infected a program complier for Delphi [49]. The 
virus introduces its own code to a new program that infects 
many systems unknown by the programmer. This backdoor 
attack worked elusively in the background until discovered a 
year later. This demonstrates the danger of backdoor attacks. 
Most of the time, antivirus solutions are able to thwart  
backdoor intrusion [38]. However, this requires the right 
signature embedded into the antivirus and the detection can 
only be executed in host-based environment. For this reason, 
we propose a simpler solution for detecting backdoor by using 
concepts from stepping stone detection based-research. 
Backdoor detection using the SSD concept is directed to the 
host-based level. However, it is can be extended to the 
network-based level or detection on the chain of the backdoor 








A host can be defined as a stepping stone host when the 
incoming and outgoing flow through the host is the same.  In 
the backdoor situation, the detection occurs when a connection 
occurs for a many times for a specific port. It usually happens 
when the affected host suddenly sends a data to the outside 
network using the same port number and at the same period of 
time. If the backdoor affects a number of hosts (used as 
stepping stone), we can use (2) to overcome the problem. 
Open research questions include the number of occurrences 
that need to be counted and the port affected by backdoors. 
 
D. DoS Attack Detection  
A DoS or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a 
kind of attack that attempts to make network resources 
unavailable [39].  Usually, DDoS attacks occur to websites 
hosted on high-profile web servers such as banks or credit card 
payment gateways. 
There are several types of DoS/DDoS attacks. SYN 
flooding is a type of DoS attack where many SYN packets are 
sent and never acknowledged, delaying other users from 
accessing the server and in severe cases jeopardizing users 
when the server shuts down completely [40].    
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DoS attacks may be solved by manipulating firewall settings 
[41]. Research by [42] on the other hand addresses DDoS by 
using a special Intrusion Detection System (IDS). In [43], 
DDoS is solved by using neural network. A variety of artificial 
intelligence may be used for addressing DoS attacks.    








Figure 11: DoS Attack System 
 
From Figure Assuming there are several attackers, sending 
many requests to the victim simultaneously, therefore causes 
the legitimate user to be unable to send any request to the 
victim.  This is the basic nature of the DoS problem.  




Referring to Eq. (8), by locating the victim as the stepping 
stoned host, the stepping stone is detected if the number of the 
incoming flow is less than the number of outgoing flow for the 
host. The number of incoming and outgoing flows should be 
balanced for each host.  If k is the last of host n and based on 
Eq. (2), it is possible to find the origin of the DoS attack. 
 
 
VI. PRELIMINARY RESULT 
Section 5.1 to Section 5.4 illustrate that each type of 
security threat may be characterized by equations given in 




Table 1: Application and Formula 
 





























Table 1 shows that each network threat requires a very 
simple formula for detection.  SSD provides a simple solution 
for addressing the network threat at hand, thereby eliminating 
the need for more computationally expensive methods for 
detection.   SSD may also be used in conjunction with existing 
detection systems forming hybrid techniques for analyzing and 
detecting these specific network threats.    
Further SSD-based applications are conceivable in the 
future and the applications listed are not exhaustive.  However, 
the preliminary models in this paper are intended to 
demonstrate that several online security threats may be 
unraveled from the SSD dimension, in conjunction with 
conventional traffic analysis techniques. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the detection of series of host computers by attackers, 
SSD has untapped potential in several emerging research 
fields, namely in spam, backdoor, proxy and DoS attack 
detection.  Four novel SSD models are presented to 
demonstrate the potential of SSD in addressing current issues 
in spam, backdoor and proxy detection.   
For future work, extensive SSD simulations and verification 
on real data such as wireless network [44, 45], and mobile 
wireless network [46] using CI methods [47, 48] for each 
emerging domain will be undertaken.   
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